reading, in the academy and in the culture generally, seems now to be what makes him most unhappy '. 2 But whereas Bellow's stance within the polemics of this period couldn't be clearer -he had written an appreciative preface to Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind (1987) , and Ravelstein was a thinly veiled portrayal of this longstanding friend -Roth has never directly affiliated himself with any of the major positions in the canon debate, and critics have struggled to define the nature of his intervention. Was Roth taking a neo-conservative stance in the manner of Bellow? That is what Kasia Boddy concluded, aligning both Roth and his protagonist Coleman Silk with 'popular conservative defences of the traditional canon, such as in Allan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind'.
3 But others positioned the novel quite differently. Stuart Jeffries emphasised the connection between Roth and another very different Bloom -Harold rather than Allan -connecting the Nietzschean tone of The Western Canon (1994) with Roth's own attack on academic ressentiment.
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In contrast, Jonathan Freedman's emphasis on the intricate ways in which The Human Stain explores the relationship between literature and cultural hybridity seemed to make Roth's novel resonate more closely with Homi Bhabha than Harold Bloom. 5 The majority of critics have in fact tended to leave this question unresolved, focusing instead on the ethical and psychological -rather than pedagogical -significance of the protagonist's mysterious transformation from an ambitious professor of classics to a nearmystical withdrawal from cultural concerns that comes about late in his life. This is not without good reason: the novel's portrayal of how Coleman Silk unexpectedly plunges into a highly charged erotic adventure with Faunia Farley, a woman who is masquerading as an illiterate, trying to strike up a friendship with a crow, and looking 'for ways to leave the human race', seems to have very little to do with wider questions about 'the state of reading' and the value of cultural memory. 6 This article is an attempt to clarify the significance of Roth's major intervention in the culture wars, and what I am going to argue is that the feeling of disjunction the novel arouses -most especially, the sheer difficulty of making its stranger side connect with any of the defined positions in the debate -is precisely where its importance lies. In the midst of the canon brawl the poet and essayist Katha Pollitt drew attention to the distinctively American character of the debate as a whole: 'the chief end of reading', she noted, had time and again been connected to the need 'to produce a desirable kind of person and a desirable kind of society. A respectful, highminded citizen of a unified society for the conservatives, an up-to-date and flexible sort for the liberals, a sub-group-identified, robustly confident one for the radicals. How pragmatic, how moralistic, how American!' 7 The first part of this article will focus on the way in which Roth engages with the specifically American ideas at stake in the canon debate in its 'pragmatic' and 'moralistic' dimensions, which descend from the complex legacy of Emersonian thinking about genius and cultural greatness. Roth's response to the political questions raised by the debate as a whole is in fact much more nuanced than has generally been recognised, and one of my aims is therefore to rebut the widely received idea, popularised by David Foster Wallace, that Roth belongs to a solipsistic tradition of 'Great American Narcissists' who have little relevance to contemporary questions about how to promote a good community. 8 But Roth's broader significance lies in the way he refuses to accept the pragmatic and moralistic horizons within which the canon debate took shape. The Human Stain draws attention to the provinciality of American concerns in a number of ways, not least by including the perspective of a French character (the only one in Roth's oeuvre) named Delphine Roux, who studied at the École Normale and is ill at ease in her adoptive home. Some of the higher-volume contributors to the canon brawl at times took an explicitly Francophobic tone, such as Harold Bloom's denunciations of 'French Shakespeare', and Roth's unflattering portrayal of Delphine would at first glance seem to play to this kind of cultural chauvinism. 9 But Roth has a longstanding interest in using Europeans to relativise American situations that stretches back to earlier Zuckerman novels such as The Anatomy Lesson (1983) and The Prague Orgy (1985) , in which he measured the trials and tribulations of an American writer against the very different situation of literature in eastern Europe. 10 In The Human Stain the significance of the French connection is more opaque, or (better put) 'delphic'. For the ancient Greeks the Delphic Oracle was a troubling source of both inanities and deep truths, and the same is true of Delphine, for lurking among her manifold trivialities is an entry on her CV that tells us her doctoral thesis was on Georges Bataille. The meaning of this allusion has not so far been explored, but Roth would have been familiar with Bataille's work through his friendship with Philippe Sollers, who had promoted Bataille's legacy in his journal Tel Quel from the early 1970s, and whom Roth impersonated in the earlier Operation Shylock (1993). 11 My claim in the second part of this article will therefore be that thinking about the way Bataille values cultural memory, and particularly his emphasis on the relationship between art, sacrifice rituals, and the sacred, will open up a clearer understanding both of the Coleman-Faunia plot in The Human Stain and also of the wider way in which this novel intervenes in the canon debate.
'Representation -that was the issue' Early in The Human Stain a bitterly ironic Coleman Silk attributes his downfall to the political demand for equal recognition: 'More blacks on campus. More black students, more black professors. Representation -that was the issue. The only issue ' ( p. 17) . But what the novel shows is that a specifically political set of questions about how to achieve equal recognition have merged with the more general academic debate over how to read and why. The event that actually triggered Coleman's downfall was his impatience with one of his student's concerns that Euripides' Hippolytus and Alcestis are 'degrading to women ' ( p. 184) : this was what first brought him into conflict with Delphine Roux, who defended the student's views as a 'feminist perspective', and patronisingly suggested to Coleman that, while he need not remove the texts from the syllabus, he should include this perspective in his teaching. 'Clearly', she explained, 'everything depends on how you teach Euripides ' ( p. 191) . While Emerson would no doubt have been appalled by Delphine Roux's opportunistic manipulation of popular moral sentiment, this willingness -so characteristic of the canon debate -to allow political questions about how to achieve equal recognition in a democratic society to spill into questions about what constitutes literary value, can in fact be traced back to him.
The significance of Emerson's Representative Men (1850) lies in the highly singular way Emerson mediated European Romantic ideas about genius into the American context. In On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (1840) his friend Thomas Carlyle had outlined a theory of genius in line with the transcendentalist vitalism that he had inherited from the Jena Romantics, and which Emerson had first encountered in Sartor Resartus (1832).
12 Setting himself against the 'melancholy work' of Victorian historicism, whose reductive view that 'the Time called [the hero] forth, the Time did everything, he nothing' would, he believed, lead only to a nihilistic condition of 'universal spiritual paralysis', Carlyle portrayed the great man (they were indeed all men) as 'the indispensable saviour of his epoch; -the lightning, without which the fuel never would be burnt'. What he saves his epoch from is its tendency towards dead conventionality, which was for Carlyle nothing less than the 'beginning of immorality': his powerful originality involves 'the stripping off of these poor undevout wrappages, nomenclatures and scientific hearsays', and with 'the afflatus and mysterious tide of vision and impulse rushing on him' he draws forth a vision, however partial, of 'the great deep Law of the World'. Moreover, because he brings such a compellingly vitalised vision, whether in the form of a new religion (Mohammed), or a great book (Shakespeare) or even a great work of criticism (Samuel Johnson), it makes sense to submit one's own more meagre self to his insight. 'Ah', Carlyle enthused, 'does not every true man feel that he is himself made higher by doing reverence to what is really above him?' 13 Emerson conceptualised greatness as 'representative' rather than heroic, but the primary meaning he gave to this term was identical with Carlyle's transcendentalist vitalism. 'With each new mind a new secret of nature transpires', Emerson claimed, adding (audaciously) 'nor can the Bible be closed, until the last great man is born'. He also accepted Carlyle's emphasis on submitting the self to the work of genius, claiming that 'these men correct the delirium of the animal spirits, make use considerate, and engage us in new aims and powers', and shared his view that their inspiring model helps 'defend us from our contemporaries', such that the great man is an 'indemnification' from a 'population of pygmies'. 14 However, with the publication of Carlyle's Past and Present (1843) the antidemocratic implications of extending Romantic enthusiasm into questions about cultural leadership had become obvious, and in the opening paragraphs of Representative Men Emerson warned his readers of 'the danger of modern studies', admonishing them to 'begin low enough', to keep in mind 'the substantial existence of other people', and to acknowledge that 'we have social strengths ' ( p. 616) . The secondary meaning Emerson attributed to 'representative' was therefore a capacity to promote equal recognition and E Pluribus Unum the metaphor of democratic process was used explicitly ( p. 619). 'The greatest genius is the most indebted man', he claimed, 'a heart in unison with his time and country … The Genius of our life is jealous of individuals, and will not have any individual great, except through the general ' ( p. 710) . This notion finds its clearest expression in the essay on Shakespeare, who is described as 'the man who carries the Saxon race in him by the inspiration which feeds him ' ( p. 711) . 15 In joining together these two different ways of conceptualising representativeness, Emerson granted more to the singular value of the individual, and therefore advised a certain suspiciousness about any given construction of the canon:
A new danger appears in the excess influence of the great man. His attractions warp us from our place. We have become underlings and intellectual suicides. Ah! yonder in the horizon is our help: -other great men, new qualities, counterweights and checks on each other. We cloy of the honey of each peculiar greatness … We balance one man with his opposite, and the health of the state depends on the see-saw. ( p. 627)
Emerson therefore clearly envisages not just the possibility but the necessity of an ongoing canon debate for democratic reasons: it is not simply the health of the individual but the 'health of the state' that depends upon a continual rebalancing of the canon for reasons of equal recognition of the expressive capacities of the people as a whole.
The late twentieth-century canon debate can in many ways be understood as the coming apart of the competing demands that Emerson placed on the idea of canonicity. On the one hand, neoconservative intellectuals such as Allan Bloom deplored what they saw as the politicisation of the canon on robustly transcendentalist grounds that it is representative of a 'higher life' than the student's immersion in convention would otherwise engage, such that 'great mysteries might be revealed to him, that new and higher motives of action might be discovered within him, that a different 15 Kim Sturgess has argued that Emerson's use of the term 'Saxon' is connected to a longstanding 'cult of Anglo-Saxonism' that he traces back to Jefferson, which was based on a desire to separate the political and national construct of Britain from a cultural inheritance that could provide a 'focus for American pride and exceptionalism'. See Shakespeare and the American Nation (Cambridge 2004) p. 117. and more human way of life can be harmoniously constructed'. 16 This view was often flatly rejected by those who pursued instead the countervailing definition of 'representative', especially through what became known as the hermeneutics of suspicion: Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, for example, argued that 'elite culture' should be scrutinised with 'attention to issues of gender, race, and class as proxies for the subjective testimony of those excluded from the most exalted cultural roles '. 17 But other critics of the canon, such as Arnold Krupat, Professor of Native American Literature at Sarah Lawrence, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., made the more deeply Emersonian argument that the 'health of the state' requires a balancing act between different ways of thinking about cultural memory. Gates argued that while a literary canon must aim to have an inspirational value as 'the commonplace book of our shared culture', if it is to be truly representative in democratic rather than just qualitative terms it must recognise the experience of 'women or people of color', who need to 'discover their reflection or representation of their images, or hear the resonances of their cultural voices'.
18 Krupat also made the distinctively Emersonian move of mediating between a 'transcendentalist-essentialist' idealisation of the traditional canon and an 'instrumental or pragmatic view', which seeks to re-ground ideas about greatness through the representation of minority experience: combining both views together, Krupat called for a 'secular heterodoxy' that must include 'more than merely occasional examples of the literatures produced by red and black people as well as white people' to generate 'a common culture, one that may at least imply a common society'. 19 As Craig Ireland has argued in Subaltern Appeal to Experience (2005) , this way of conceptualising experience in relation to identity-formation is particular to 'late modernity'; but the discursive frame for this dimension of the canon debate nonetheless clearly descends from Emerson's attempt to connect even literary greatness (as with the example of Shakespeare) with the goals of equal recognition and the 'health of the state' in a pluralist democracy.
Roth's response to this aspect of the canon debate is more complex than it might first appear. The most headline-grabbing aspect of his work is of course its merciless satire of the hermeneutics of suspicion. In Sabbath's Theater the protagonist Mickey Sabbath is saddened to find that young Debbie's inner life has been so colonised by the deadening proprieties of pseudo-feminism that her response to Yeats's 'Meru' is merely limited to a suspicion of his 'unconscious gender privileging -his terror, his glory, his ( phallic) monuments'. Equally, Coleman Silk speaks powerfully when he claims that his student's supposedly feminist perspective on Euripides banalises rather than affirms her human singularity: 'To read two plays like Hippolytus and Alcestis, then to listen to a week of classroom discussion on each, then to have nothing to say about either of them other than that they are "degrading to women", isn't a "perspective", for Christ's sake -it's mouthwash. It's just the latest mouthwash'.
20 But Roth's satire, caustic though it may be, is carefully judged. It is aimed not at the ideal of democratic representativeness itself but at the over-literal interpretation of the ideal, and in this way Roth compares interestingly to the Bourdieu-inspired critique of the canon debate made by John Guillory.
In Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (1993) Guillory argued that the reason the canon debate had tended to generate more heat than light was because it derived from 'a confusion between representation in the political sense -the relation of a representative to a community -and representation in the rather different sense of the relation between an image and what the image represents'. The collapse of the former into the latter, he argued, 'has had the unfortunate effect of allowing the participants in the "symbolic struggle" over representation in the canon to overestimate the political effects of this struggle, at the same time that the participants have remained relatively blind to the social and institutional conditions of symbolic struggles'. Moreover, as Guillory went on to argue, canonical texts have at best a marginal role in the reproduction of social order because it is the institution itself, rather than the text, which disseminates both 'linguistic capital, the means by which one attains to a socially credentialed and therefore valued speech', and 'symbolic capital, a kind of knowledge-capital whose possession can be displayed upon request and which thereby entitles its possessor to the cultural and material rewards of the well-educated person'. Whereas the focus of debates on the relationship between education and representation had been on university curricula, what Guillory's emphasis on institutions recognised was that 'the university belongs to an educational system inclusive of every level and every kind of school', and that 'the absence of any concept of a specific school culture in the debate' has badly skewed its political salience, displacing mainstream attention from the fact that 'the democratisation of the school has been … subverted by the 20 Philip Roth, Sabbath's Theater (New York 1995) pp. 165, 192. withdrawal of public funding, the "de-skilling" of teachers, and the virtual removal of texts, literary or otherwise, from the classroom'.
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The Democrat-voting Roth, who came to intellectual maturity in the milieu of the left-leaning New York Intellectuals, clearly shares Guillory's concern that the real 'social and institutional conditions' at stake in the ideal of representation should not be displaced by debates over literary representation, and that 'school culture' rather than the university is indeed the most salient point of reference for these questions. I Married a Communist features a highly idealised portrayal of Murray Ringold, a left-wing teacher in the 1940s, and exalts his efforts to equip minority students like Nathan Zuckerman with linguistic and symbolic capital through the powerful rhetoric of Shakespeare's plays. In The Human Stain Clarence Silk, Coleman's father, would recognise himself in this ideal: he regards 'the language of Chaucer, Shakespeare and Dickens' ( p. 92) primarily as a vital resource of linguistic capital that it is very much in his interest to acquire -and which he does acquire, to the extent that his resources of 'deliberateness and precision and directness … could wither you with words' ( p. 93). While his son Coleman took a rather different kind of inspiration from the language of Shakespeare, Clarence's other children thrived as schoolteachers genuinely advancing the cause of African American representation in the wider polity. He would have been proud of his granddaughter Lisa, patiently encouraging a different generation of minority students such as Carmen and Hernando in her Reading Recovery programme in New York City ( p. 58), and of his daughter Ernestine's denunciations of the academic 'buffoonery' ( p. 328) that distracts attention from the real work to be done in achieving democracy.
Clarence Silk would also, one imagines, have appreciated some of Roth's more delicate ironies at the expense of racially essentialist ways of conceptualising the relationship between art and experience. The Human Stain takes great pains to be representative of canonical African American achievements in the arts through its extensive portrayal of jazz music, and yet, as Jonathan Freedman has pointed out, in each case on closer inspection the music turns out to be a melange of inter-racial appropriations, blending together George Gershwin and Roy Eldridge, African American traditions with Jewish klesmer, in a 'dance of white appropriation and appreciation' 21 John Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon Formation (Chicago 1993) pp. viii-ix, 38. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., also warned that debates over literary representativeness could serve to obscure 'real-world commitments', noting that 'we pay homage to the marginalized and demonized, and it feels almost as if we've righted a real-world injustice. I always think of the folktale about the fellow who killed seven with one blow' (Loose Canons, p. 19).
that brings 'a deep undecidability into the novel's ethnoracial cultural mix'.
22 But Freedman actually misses Roth's best de-essentialising joke. Has Coleman misrecognised his blackness by surrendering himself to the whiteface of the ancient Greek classics, which he has spent his life teaching at Athena College? Not according to the scholarship. In Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization (1987), Martin Bernal, Professor of Near-Eastern Studies at Cornell, argued that the notion that ancient Greek culture was ethnically 'Aryan' was an invention of 'eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Romantics and racists', and that Athens descended instead from a mixed African and Semitic migration from Egypt and Phoenicia around 1500 BC. Both black and Jewish, it is no small irony that Coleman himself is much better 'represented' by the playwrights of ancient Athens than by the culture wars of supposedly enlightened 1990s Athena.
'To want to be stupendous'
In various ways, then, The Human Stain suggests that the attempt to link the process of representation in creative literature to the promotion of democratic participation can be very misleading: it distracts from more important questions about how to actually achieve representation, and it opens the door not only to a banalising connection between political and literary representation, but to an over-essentialised link between art and experience. Responding to these limitations there emerged in the 1990s an alternative way of interpreting the Emersonian tradition that was articulated by a number of thinkers, including Charles Altieri, Richard Rorty, and Harold Bloom, towards which The Human Stain is much more sympathetic. This position can be very broadly summarised as an attempt to move beyond both neoconservatism and the hermeneutics of suspicion by decoupling the Carlylean dimension of Emersonian thinking from the goal of democratic representativeness, and qualifying its authoritarian dimension by disconnecting Emerson's emphasis on vitalistic individualism from his transcendentalism.
Rorty's Achieving Our Country (1998) was the bluntest expression of this move, flatly rejecting what he thought of as the Platonistic argument that 'conflates inspiration and knowledge by saying that only the eternal inspires', and suggesting that 'we should cheerfully admit that canons are temporary, and touchstones replaceable'. What he offered instead was a pragmatist notion of greatness, such that 'we should see great works of literature as great because they have inspired many readers', not because 22 Klesmer America, p. 192. they embody ideal qualities, and that the pragmatic function of a canon is simply 'to be able to offer suggestions to the young about where they might find excitement and hope'. 23 Altieri also defined the canon in antitranscendentalist terms as a diverse legacy of ways to model and harness human energies, arguing that the canon remains 'a vital resource for the present' through its very otherness to contemporary ideals and expectations. 'It provides intensities that challenge our contemporary habits', Altieri claimed: 'it demands that we measure ourselves against the processes of questioning, projecting identifications, and struggling with precursors that we find in the relations among authors preserved by the canon'.
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Abandoning the transcendentalist dimension of Emerson's theory, though, what both Rorty and Altieri emphatically preserved was his optimistic meliorism, especially his notion that the inspiring energies and alterities held within cultural memory can and should ramify both in the self and the wider polity: 'great men exist that there may be greater men', Emerson claimed, and 'the smallest acquisition of truth or of energy, in any quarter, is so much good to the commonwealth of souls' ( p. 631). In the context of Achieving Our Country, the kinds of 'hope' that Rorty had in mind as being inspired by great works were of an explicitly collectivist kind, in relation to the broad reformist optimism of the Old Left; Altieri also extended Emerson's pragmatist meliorism with a very can-do emphasis on the inspirational value of the canon for self-creation, emphasising that great literature enables us to 'develop a richer sense not of our obligations, but of our options', such that 'agents can identify with these various expressive performances as means of extending their own sensibilities; they can quarrel with them as challenges or provocations to readers to clarify desires or test alternative stances; or they can build from those performances elaborate frameworks that enable them to share evaluative and interpretive models with others'.
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The main differences within this group of 'second-wave' theorists in the canon debate were differences of emphasis on this particular question of value to society against value to self. Whereas both Rorty and Altieri tended to emphasise the benign effects that inspiring literature might have on the wider polity, with Altieri describing the canon as a repository of 'alternative modes of thinking and feeling that allow us to track certain features of one 23 But in fact the connection with Bloom goes well beyond that of shared resonance. In the section on Julius Caesar in Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human (1998), Bloom rather counter-intuitively singled out the character of Caesar as the 'true gold', defining him as 'the free artist of himself in this play, in living and dying', adding rather whimsically that he has an 'underlying impression that Caesar is the playwright', and 'that Shakespeare himself … played Julius Caesar'. 27 Correspondingly, in The Human Stain Coleman 'Brutus' Silk is inspired not by his namesake but by the following lines from Caesar, which Bloom had also quoted, when they are read by the minister at his father's funeral: 'Cowards die many times before their death; | The valiant never taste of death but once' ( p. 107). Whereas Clarence wanted Coleman to go to Howard University and use the resources of linguistic and symbolic capital he acquired to be an inspiring role model for the black community in its struggle for recognition, when Coleman hears Caesar's lines what they inspire in him is 'to want to be stupendous'. And he couches the drive to ebullient self-affirmation in distinctively Bloomian terms:
'What can be avoided / Whose end is purposed by the mighty gods?' Lines also from Julius Caesar, and yet only with his father in the grave did Coleman at last bother to hear them -and when he did, instantaneously to aggrandize them. This had been purposed by the mighty gods! Silky's freedom. The raw I. All the subtlety of being Silky Silk. ( p. 108)
Deciding, like Caesar, to ignore the soothsayer ('"Beware the ides of March." Bullshit -beware nothing'), Coleman finds himself, through the ministration of Shakespeare, 'repowered' and 'free to go ahead and be stupendous' by escaping his African American identity in a self-reliant way. But to do so Coleman has to rid himself of his mother, and aware that doing so will be little short of murder -'he was murdering her', he reflects as he tells her of his schemes ( p. 138) -he finds that he can take inspiration from Macbeth. Bloom defined Macbeth as the 'most imaginative' of Shakespeare's heroes, and again identified him with Shakespeare himselfonly this time with Shakespeare's own faculty of imagination: 'A great killing machine', Bloom enthused, 'Macbeth is endowed by Shakespeare with something less than ordinary intelligence, but with a power of fantasy so enormous that pragmatically it seems to be Shakespeare's own'.
28 What Macbeth's 'power of fantasy' most thrives on, according to Bloom, is the terrifying human capacity not simply to perform evil actions but to delight in them, to find the scale and intensity that evil can bring to the imagination a source of vivid satisfaction. This sense of his own pleasurable magnitude in evil is exactly what Coleman draws from the play when hatching his plan:
To get that from life, the alternate destiny, on one's own terms, he must do what must be done. Don't most people want to walk out of the fucking lives they've been handed? But they don't, and that's what makes them them, and this was what was making him him. Throw the punch, do the damage, and forever lock the door. You can't do this to a wonderful mother who loves you unconditionally and has made you happy … Once you've done a thing like this, you have done so much violence it can never be undone, which is what Coleman wants. ( p. 138)
The passage is permeated with the aggressive energy that Coleman is bringing into his self-creation, but above all it resonates with this line from Macbeth: 'If it were done when' tis done, then 'twere well | It were done quickly' (I. vii. 1-2). Macbeth's repetitions of 'done' chime together, ramifying the guilty magnitude of the act in his susceptible imagination: as he does so, the slaying of Duncan ceases to be an act of narrowly ambitious ingratitude, and becomes ever more terrifyingly resonant -ultimately a violation of the natural order, an unloosing of hell onto earth. Macbeth's 'power of fantasy', distilled into these one and a half resonant lines, allows Coleman to acquire a sense of his own apocalyptic significance as a performing self. The betrayal of a parent could, in other hands (for instance Delphine's), seem merely ungrateful or resentful, but through Macbeth Coleman becomes 'stupendous' rather than cheap. 'Once you've done a thing like this, you have done so much violence it can never be undone:' as the 'dones' chime together, the imaginative significance of his murder escalates into a richer scale.
Through Caesar and Macbeth Coleman does indeed find an inspirational energy that is the perfect 'antidote for cabalism', as Emerson put it -in this case the cabalism of the community in which he was raised. But despite the distinctively Bloomian quality of this episode, the novel's portrayal of Coleman is in other ways closer to Altieri's and Rorty's more expansively Emersonian sense of how the acquisition of greatness can diffuse itself into benefits for the polity at large. After all, despite his disavowal of his 'roots', Coleman doesn't simply fight for his own hand in life, and the novel emphasises the way in which his self-creation is heightened by its imaginative involvement in what Altieri called 'compelling ideals for human work'. Not only does he clean out Athena, 'an antiquated, backwater, Sleepy Hollowish college' ( p. 5) of its deadwood WASP professors and inject it with the energies of a new generation of ambitious scholars, in doing so he brings a great boost in economic prosperity to the nearby town: the shops smarten themselves up, and the town starts to grow because of his 'revolution of quality'. We seem close here to the optimistic meliorism that Emerson associated with the inspirational value of greatness, albeit shorn of his transcendentalist language: 'What is good is effective, generative', Emerson thought; 'a good apple produces seeds … constructive fertile, magnetic, inculcating armies with his purpose, which is then executed' ( p. 620). On one level, therefore, while this episode in The Human Stain clearly engages Bloomian ways of thinking about literary strength, it also resonates with the more outward-looking version of Emersonian vitalism being popularised by other theorists in the 1990s. Coleman Silk is after all someone who brings 'much good to the commonwealth of souls'.
'There is this need and it is undying and it is profound' However, Coleman's pursuit of 'the raw I' is not the only way in which this complex novel explores the value of cultural memory. Indeed, several critics have followed Ross Posnock's claim that The Human Stain is in fact a critique of Coleman's vitalistic individualism, and shared his rather negative evaluation of Coleman's self-creation as 'self-imposed purification, a subjection of the core self to a disciplinary project'.
29 My suggestion will be that Roth in fact sets up the narrative experience of the novel in such a way that it avoids this kind of moralistic disapproval of Coleman's great and fructifying life -but Posnock's emphasis on the strange fascination Coleman acquires for Faunia, who is masquerading as an illiterate so as to 'spice things up' (as Zuckerman speculates) certainly speaks to an unignorable dimension of the novel. What critics have struggled with is how to make the connection between what happens to Coleman after his expulsion from Athena to the novel's wider engagement with the canon debate: this part of the story just seems to have very little to do with the novel's wider reflections on the nature and value of cultural memory.
As I suggested earlier, the answer lies in the novel's French connection, and particularly in the allusion to Bataille. Despite their many differences, what the various positions we have just considered all share is a desire to make literature 'innocent', as Bataille put it. They bespeak a desire to make literature serve some kind of identifiable good, whether to the polity at large or to the individual in particular. But 'literature is not innocent', Bataille argued in Literature and Evil, 'it is guilty and should admit itself so'. Properly conceived, great literature -which he distinguished from 'the mass of books designed to put a great many people on the wrong scent' -will always seem evil because what it generates is a form of limit experience that pushes beyond the horizon of human valuation, and opens onto what he called 'the sacred', a term he wished to reappropriate from the more domesticated modern forms of religion, and which he often connected with the experience of primitive sacrifice rituals.
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Bataille's claim was that anthropologists had only superficially explained sacrifice rituals in relation to fertility myths, and that they should also be understood as an aesthetic spectacle through which spectators were able to explore the porous boundary between the human and the animal. In watching a sacrifice ritual the audience was able to experience the mystery of embodiment in a vicarious way and recover, albeit fleetingly, an intuition of what Bataille called 'intimacy': a sense of the primal immanence that Hegel had argued was characteristic of pre-cultural experience.
31 'Death is the great affirmer, the wonder-struck cry of life', Bataille urged: 'The real order must annul -neutralize -that intimate life and replace it with the thing that the individual is in the society of labor. But it cannot prevent life's disappearance in death from revealing the invisible brilliance of life that is not a thing. The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life, that life's intimacy does not reveal its dazzling consumption until the moment it gives out.'
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The pleasurableness of a vicarious encounter with death through sacrifice therefore lies partly in the reminder that one's organic existence is, at a primitive level, 'not a thing' to be disciplined and manipulated in the ways that 'the real order', with its 'society of labor', encourages. But what underlies Bataille's paradoxical description of death as the 'wonder-struck cry of life' is his analysis of the way the sacrifice ritual engorges its victims with forms of affective intensity so extreme that they simply cannot (except, Bataille thought, within certain forms of violent erotic transgression) be experienced in the acculturated self. 'Emotion tied to the limits of reason only offers us a compressed life', Bataille argued in 'The Cruel Practice of Art', but the tormented rage experienced by a helpless and guiltless victim being led to the sacrifice, followed by the terror -yet also perhaps the strange serenity -of confronting the end of everything, create what he called affective 'irruptions', which 'contain all the truth of emotion in the instant of ravishment'. And while sacrifice itself is of course 'no longer a living institution', Bataille argued that it nonetheless remains with us, 'rather like a trace on a streaky window', a human stain that we cannot erase: pre-eminently, Bataille thought, it remains with us through the festive experience of tragic art. 'It is possible', he suggested, 'for us to experience the emotion [sacrifice] aroused, for the myths of sacrifice are like the themes of tragedy'. In tragedy we are licensed to take pleasure in watching an often guiltless hero suffer rage and confront his or her mortality, and in this way 'art, which puts us on the path of complete destruction and suspends us there for a time, offers us ravishment without death'. of the novel, Zuckerman frequently has cause to reflect on the mountainous New England landscape, with its 'mammoth rocks all tumbled sideways' that resemble 'a ravaged Stonehenge' ( p. 296) -the best-known site at which sacrifice rituals were practised in ancient England. Equally, there is a ritual quality to Faunia's bewilderingly 'wonder struck' description of her first suicide attempt:
To me it was ecstatic, getting myself ready. There are times in life worth celebrating. Triumphant times. The occasions for which dressing up was intended. Oh, how I turned myself out. I braided my hair. I did my eyes. Would have made my own mother proud, and that's saying something … It was calm and peaceful. The kids are gone and there's no one to worry about and I have all the time in the world. If only I'd done it right. The pleasure there was in it. Finally where there is none, there is that last joyous moment, when death should come on your own angry terms, but you don't feel angry -just elated. ( p. 239) Faunia's bewildering series of connections between rage, death and pleasure (even elation) resonates with Bataille's aestheticisation of sacrifice ritual. But while Faunia is 'looking for ways to leave the human race' in the most literal sense, the theatre, and in particular what Zuckerman describes as the 'outdoor theater sacred to Dionysus' ( p. 314), enacts rituals in which 'the venerable human dream of a situation in which one man can embody evil' in a more vicarious way: 'there is this need', Zuckerman tells us, 'and it is undying and it is profound'.
While Coleman Silk drew inspiration from Shakespeare for his ebullient self-creation, it is the theatre sacred to Dionysus to which he owes the last act of his life: Sophocles' Oedipus the King. The epigraph to The Human Stain connects Coleman's story with this play's overtly ritualistic contextualisation of its action: 'What is this rite of purification? How shall it be done?', asks Oedipus. 'By banishing a man, or expiation of blood by blood', Creon grimly replies. Ansu Louis and Gurumurthy Neelakantan have pointed out some of the manifold ways in which Coleman's life resonates with that of Oedipus: both men undergo 'passing' narratives (Oedipus passed as a Corinthian, but was really a Theban all along); both have 'inappropriate' sexual relations that everyone finds abhorrent; neither man is strictly speaking guilty of his transgression, but is subject to forces well beyond his control. 34 However, this last point is particularly salient within the American discourse on canonicity. As Lawrence Levine has shown, one of the reasons why Shakespeare, whose work was so often the flashpoint for debates in the 1980s and 1990s, became so popular in America in the nineteenth century was because, through a highly selective emphasis on plays about the slaying of tyrants (Richard III and Julius Caesar were the most frequently produced), Shakespearian drama 'appeared to buttress American values and confirm American expectations' about the self-reliant overcoming of malign authority. Oedipus the King, however, was twice performed in New York in the nineteenth century, and was both times a commercial disaster: 'Sophocles seemed guilty of determinism', Levine suggests, 'an ideological stance nineteenth century Americans rejected out of hand'.
35
The tragic downfall of Oedipus from great king and saviour of his people to disgusting pariah offers little in the way of inspiration for self-creation or social hope.
Instead, the ritual action of the play generates an experience founded on what Philip Fisher has called the 'vehement passions': excessive forms of affective arousal that overwhelm the prudential, calculating self, and generate a sense of acutely involved immediacy. The sacrifice ritual that Oedipus undergoes begins in earnest with the descent into a vehement rage provoked by his growing realisation of helplessness before the hideous truth of his life: feeling himself descending into irrationality he starts referring to himself as 'this stranger', and as he becomes ever more possessed by uncontrollable affective 'irruptions', as Bataille called them, he is recognised by the Chorus as a sacrificial offering to Dionysus.
36 When Zuckerman first encounters Coleman he too is engorged with rage, and his rage is so vehement that it has already pushed him beyond the human:
The way he careened around the room made me think of those familiar chickens that keep on going after having been beheaded. His head had been lopped off, the head encasing the educated brain of the once unassailable faculty dean and classics professor, and what I was witnessing was the amputated rest of him spinning out of control. ( p. 11)
Like an already-sacrificed animal releasing its blood back into the earth, Coleman's rage is haunted by the spectre of death: 'Once you're in its grip', Zuckerman portends, 'it's as though it will have to kill you for you to be free of it ' ( p. 12) . But what really interests Zuckerman is not the rage itself but what it becomes -or rather, the form of becoming achieved through its transformation. What Zuckerman can't understand, but which fascinates him in a way he finds almost frightening, is how his friend has penetrated through to an 'odd, serene state of contentment ' ( p. 20) . And the story that Zuckerman tries to re-create, both for our readerly pleasure and out of his own intense fascination with this mysterious passage of affective transformation, resonates powerfully with the ineradicable human stain of sacrifice rituals.
As in Bataille's account of the rapture of self-loss, Coleman and Faunia seem to become both more and less than human as their life becomes ever more entangled with death. Zuckerman depicts them as strangely identical with 'the disaster to which they are conjoined … dancing their way stark naked right into a violent death ' ( p. 209) , and what we are able to vicariously enjoy through their rage and their fear is a form of affective experience that is so mysterious and intense it is hard to name. This is what Zuckerman tries to define as 'an unearthly paradise of earthbound lust', in which 'their coupling is the drama into which they decant all the angry disappointment in their lives ' ( p. 203) . The concept of decanting their rage is crucial: through the highly ritualised dance Faunia performs before Coleman, 'smeared and anointed' ( p. 226) by her own sexual fluids, all the wild energy of their rage is decanted into a bewilderingly intense form of serenity. The dance is 'high voltage stuff ' and as it advances, 'giving him her downturned look with the subtlety in it, she moves, she moves, and the formal transfer of power begins', igniting them in a way that reaches past the human to a state of organic intimacy: 'So soon in the dance', Faunia realises, 'and already she could peel him and eat him like a piece of fruit ' ( p. 227) . Leaving the human race, Faunia celebrates the 'instant of ravishment' they have attained:
That's what I see: your fury. I see the anger and the shame. I see that you understand as an old man what time is. You don't understand that till near the end. But now you do. And it's frightening. Because you can't do it again … How do I know this? Because you're with me. Why else would you be with me, if you weren't so fucking enraged? And why would I be with you, if I wasn't so fucking enraged? That's what makes for the great fucking, Coleman. The rage that levels everything. So don't lose it. ( p. 234) Faunia would despise any attempt to sentimentalise this as love: her hope is that Coleman has 'had all the love-shit kicked out of him totally' by his rage ( p. 230) . This is inhuman intimacy, an intimacy created within a sacred space which, in a pre-Christian, pre-Jewish way, is so rapturously infused with 'the invisible brilliance of life' that it might even, as Coleman puts it, 'prove the existence of God ' ( p. 229) . At the heart of this novel, therefore, is a sacrifice ritual that engages for the reader's vicarious pleasure a human need that is enduring and profound -a need that Bataille claimed the greatest of art does most to satisfy.
'Calling a halt to your trivial thinking' Thinking about Bataille on art and the sacred enables us to see how the story of Coleman and Faunia is part of the novel's wider engagement with the canon debate: this part of The Human Stain is very much about art and cultural memory as well. But what does all the above actually add up to?
Faunia's answer is clear: the only thing that matters is the 'great fucking' that comes with transmuted rage, and Coleman's stupendous self-creation is just a bridge to that rage. To her, Coleman's life before the moment of their sexual encounter, the whole history of his rise and his fall, is simply 'a load of assholes not liking him -it's no big deal' ( p. 234). 'You really think that this is the important stuff in the world? It's not that important', she thinks, 'It's not important at all' ( p. 235). In fact Faunia not only finds everything in Coleman's earlier life irrelevant, she has little more than contempt for the great drive to achieve equal recognition through literacy that was pioneered by Clarence Silk, and extended by his son Walter, his daughter Ernestine, and his granddaughter Lisa. Against their earnest devotion to the social hope that America might be made a less unjust place if linguistic and symbolic capital were spread about more equally, Faunia actually seeks to abjure language itself, delighting in the caws of the crow, pretending to be illiterate, and coming on dumb in every way but the erotic. 'All the social ways of thinking, shut' em down ' ( p. 230) : that is the far horizon of her philosophy, and there is no doubting that The Human Stain does much to seduce its readers into sharing her contempt for the sheer triviality of the cultural concerns manifested in the canon debate, when measured against the apocalyptic significance of the affective life she can access by flirting with violence and ultimately death itself.
But another way of thinking about the novel is flagged up in a moment near the end, when Nathan Zuckerman describes the pristine New England scene of an iced-over lake, itself participating in a purifying ritual of sorts:
It gave you an idea, as such places do -as they're cherished for doingof what the world was like before the advent of man. The power of nature is sometimes very calming, and this was a calming place, calling a halt to your trivial thinking without, at the same time, overawing you with reminders of the nothingness of a life span and the vastness of extinction. It was all on a scale safely this side of the sublime. A man could absorb all the beauty into his being without feeling belittled or permeated by fear. ( p. 345) This is a better description of how The Human Stain engages the reader than Faunia's reductive vision. The novel's fascination with the way art can vicariously immerse you in affective 'irruptions' that are strictly useless for the life in culture, and thereby intuit something of 'what the world was like before the advent of man', does indeed 'call a halt to your trivial thinking' by throwing the Emersonian character of the canon debate into sharp relief. At times, the novel makes not just the project of using literature to promote exuberant self-creation, but the very concept of any kind of human idealism, seem very shallow indeed when compared to the rapturous excitement of the sacred. But it also does something more complex: it calls a halt to trivial thinking 'without, at the same time, overawing you', allowing you to absorb the beauty of the pre-human scene 'without feeling belittled or permeated by fear'.
The Human Stain achieves this complex intervention through its unusual narrative structure, which forces the very different ways of conceptualising value it stages into dialogue. The reading I have given in this article has, of necessity, artificially organised the novel into a series of responses to different aspects of the canon debate, and in doing so it has assembled the relevant evidence without any regard for the actual unfolding of narrative experience through time. But if we put the different centres of value I have identified -the hard-headed concern for democratic participation, the celebration of ebullient self-creation, the rapturous experience of the sacredback into the narrative, a much more complex picture will emerge.
Zuckerman repeatedly insists on the way life creates unexpected reversals, and the best example of this is the shift from the opening chapter, 'Everybody Knows', which narrates his fascination with Coleman and Faunia's mysterious transformation, into 'Slipping the Punch', which suddenly shifts over fifty years backwards in time, and audaciously trumps the form of pleasure celebrated in the opening chapter with the aesthetically compelling intensity of its description of Coleman's self-creation. At this point we actually shift away from the mysterious ecstasy of self-loss to one of Roth's greatest stretches of imaginative writing, where he conjures up the sheer joy of making oneself stupendous, even (or perhaps especially) when that involves highly charged acts of moral murder. Then in the next chapter, 'What Do You Do With the Kid Who Can't Read?', the imaginative memory of Coleman's stupendous self powerfully informs against Delphine's bungling attempts to make herself significant by manipulating Athena's thin moral rhetoric, even while Coleman's past is now pitched against increasingly vibrant descriptions of the ecstasies generated by 'the rage that levels everything', such as the passage discussed above. In fact the timeline of the novel is continually recursive, involving the present with the past in a way that forces very different kinds of value to coexist in the same imaginative space. Other effects, such as Roth's use of the uncanny, only add to this destabilising effect: in a vivid hallucinatory sequence in the third chapter, Lisa Silk's Reading Recovery student is suddenly supplanted, in Coleman's imagination, by Faunia, another 'girl who can't read', and in this setting it is hard not to recoil with disgust at the illiberal fantasy of closing down 'social ways of thinking' that she embodies. Then a similarly uncanny effect is thrown in at the very end of the novel when the funeral orations lauding Coleman's self-reliant American individualism are undercut by his double, Ernestine, who restates the importance of working to achieve equal representation, and resisting academic 'buffoonery' in doing so.
'Imagine if the crows were in charge. Would it be the same shit all over again? ' ( p. 169) . This is, comically, the sum total of Faunia's social wisdom, and at moments like these the novel alerts us to the impossibility -even the mania -of trying to organise the complex legacies of cultural memory into a programme for the improvement of self and society: literature cannot be made innocent, because it is stained by human needs that are 'undying' and 'profound'. But The Human Stain also invites us, as did Emerson himself albeit in an very different way, to disregard the moralistic will to truth that demands we decide between different kinds of value. It points beyond the canon debate not only by provincialising its concerns, but by drawing together competing, and incommensurate, notions of how to value cultural memory.
